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Abstract. Gimli is a family of cryptographic primitives (both a hash
function and an AEAD scheme) that has been selected for the second
round of the NIST competition for standardizing new lightweight de-
signs. The candidate Gimli is based on the permutation Gimli, which was
presented at CHES 2017. In this paper, we study the security of both
the permutation and the constructions that are based on it. We exploit
the slow diffusion in Gimli and its internal symmetries to build, for the
first time, a distinguisher on the full permutation of complexity 264. We
also provide a practical distinguisher on 23 out of the full 24 rounds of
Gimli that has been implemented.
Next, we give (full state) collision and semi-free-start collision attacks on
Gimli-Hash, reaching respectively up to 12 and 18 rounds. On the practi-
cal side, we compute a collision on 8-round Gimli-Hash. In the quantum
setting, these attacks reach 2 more rounds. Finally, we perform the first
study of linear trails in Gimli, and we find a linear distinguisher on the
full permutation.
Keywords: Gimli, symmetries, symmetric cryptanalysis, full-round distinguisher,
collision attacks, linear approximations
1 Introduction
Gimli is a cryptographic permutation that was published at CHES 2017 [4]. It
is also the core primitive of a submission to the NIST lightweight cryptography
project [5] which is part of the 32 candidates that made it to the second round. It
is intended to run well on a vast variety of platforms and contexts, from powerful
processors supporting vector instructions to side-channel protected hardware.
* This article is an extended version of the paper “New Results on Gimli: Full-
Permutation Distinguishers and Improved Collisions” which appeared in the pro-
ceedings of ASIACRYPT 2020 [18].
† This work was carried out while André Schrottenloher was at Inria.
A cryptographic permutation is a versatile primitive which is easily used to
construct a hash function (as originally intended for this type of object [7]). It
was later shown that they can also be used to build authenticated ciphers [10],
pseudo-random number generators [9], etc. In all such structures, the security
of the cryptographic function relies on the properties of the permutation. In
particular, it is assumed in the underlying security proofs that the permutation
used behaves like a permutation picked uniformly at random—apart of course
from the existence of a compact implementation, a property which should not
be expected from a random object.
By definition, a cryptographic permutation does not have a key. Thus, we
cannot define its security level using a game that relies on distinguishing a ran-
dom permutation from a keyed instance with a random key. Still, since it should
behave like a permutation picked uniformly at random, we can assess its secu-
rity level by trying to identify properties that hold for the permutation studied
but which should not be expected for one picked uniformly at random. In this
context, cryptanalysts can re-use approaches originally intended for block cipher
cryptanalysis (e.g. differential attacks [11]). In fact, given that no key material is
involved, we can also borrow techniques from hash function cryptanalysis such
as rebound attacks [29].
The aim is usually then to obtain inputs of the permutation satisfying a
certain property using an algorithm which is more efficient than the generic one,
i.e. the one that would work on a random permutation.
Our Contributions. In this paper, we complete the original security analysis of
the designers of Gimli by targeting both the permutation on its own, and the
NIST candidate Gimli-Hash. Our results on the permutation are summarized in
Figure 1 (plain lines). In order to account for the different costs of the generic
attacks, we divided the logarithm of the time complexity of our distinguishers by
the logarithm of the time complexity of the corresponding generic distinguisher.
In Figure 1, a distinguisher is valid if the ratio is under 1.0. Previous attacks
from the literature are represented with dotted lines. The complexities of all our
attacks (included those against the hash function) are given in Table 1, along
with all the results from the literature we are aware of.
Our main result is a distinguisher of the full 24-round permutation with
a cost of 264, while a similar generic distinguisher has a cost of 296. We also
propose a distinguisher on 23 rounds that is practical, with a cost of 232, and has
been successfully implemented. These distinguishers exploit internal symmetries
that are encouraged by the round function. The 23-round distinguisher could be
extended by 1 round for free if the rounds were shifted.3
Using similar guess-and-determine ideas, we increase to 12 the number of
rounds susceptible to collision attacks on Gimli-Hash. A reduced-round version of
this attack has been implemented. In the quantum setting, we obtain collisions up
to 14 rounds. We also build semi-free start collisions, i.e. we show how to find one
internal state value and two different messages (thus not affecting the capacity
part) that provide a collision on the capacity after applying the permutation.
3 This behaviour appears because the linear layer of Gimli is round dependent.
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Fig. 1. Comparison of various cryptanalysis techniques. Note that we may consider
“shifted” variants of Gimli that do not start at round 24. Dotted lines correspond to
results from the literature.
This attack is more efficient than a generic one for 18 rounds classically, and
up to 20 quantumly. As a side note, these results provide a new example where
quantum attacks reach more rounds than classical ones, much like in [25]. We
also find a state-recovery attack on the authenticated encryption Gimli-Cipher
(which leads to a key-recovery) up to 12 rounds, with only 3 blocks of data.
In addition, we provide the first extensive study of the linear properties of the
round function of Gimli. We design a full-round linear distinguisher and study
faster differential-linear distinguishers on reduced-round variants.
Our implementations (23-round distinguisher, reduced-round collision attack,
search for linear trails) are available at this URL4.
Differences with [18]. This article is an extended version of the paper “New Re-
sults on Gimli: Full-Permutation Distinguishers and Improved Collisions” which
appeared in the proceedings of ASIACRYPT 2020 [18]. Our new contributions
are the state-recovery attacks explored in Section 6 and the full-round linear
distinguisher on Gimli in Section 7. The rest of the paper (e.g., the distinguishers
of Section 3 and the collision attacks of Section 4) is unchanged with respect to
the ASIACRYPT version.
Organization of the paper. The organization of the paper is as follows. In Sec-
tion 2 we provide the description of the Gimli permutation and primitive, as well
as previous known results. Section 3 provides the new distinguishers exploit-




Table 1. Results against algorithms of the Gimli family (including quantum attacks).
Time is counted in evaluations of Gimli, and memory in 128-bit blocks. Attacks that
were actually implemented are written in bold. 𝜖 is a term that we only estimated
experimentally (𝜖 ≈ 10, see Section 4). In rounds attacked, 𝑟1 → 𝑟2 means rounds 𝑟1
to 𝑟2 included.








25→ 2.5 138.5 128 192 [24]
15.5 64 64 192 [24]
Zero-sum 14 351 negl. 384 [15]
ZID 18 2 negl. 4 [34]
Linear 16 238.8 negl. 384 Sec. 7.1
Linear 24 367.6 negl. 384 Sec. 7.1
Differential-Linear 15 87.4 negl. 192 Sec. 7.2
Differential-Linear 16 110.8 negl. 192 Sec. 7.2
Differential-Linear 17 154.8 negl. 192 Sec. 7.2
Symmetry 23→ 0 32 negl. 96 Sec. 3





2 42.4 32 128 [34]
5 96 65.6 128 [34]
Preimages on





5 65 – 128 [32]
3 practical – 128 [32]
6 64 64 128 [33]
Symmetry 21→ 14 32 + 𝜖 negl. 128 Sec. 4
Symmetry 12 96 + 𝜖 negl. 128 Sec. 4




Symmetry 8 64 negl. 128 [33]
Symmetry 12 32 + 𝜖 negl. 128 Sec. 4
Symmetry 16 96 + 𝜖 negl. 128 Sec. 4
Symmetry 18 96 + 𝜖 64 128 Sec. 4
Quantum 20 64 + 𝜖 64 85.3 Sec. 4
State-recovery
on Gimli-Cipher
D & C 9 192 190 256 [33]
Symmetry 8 128 128 256 Sec. 6
Symmetry 12 192 192 256 Sec. 6
to build practical distinguishers up to 23 rounds. Section 4 presents improved
collision and semi-free start collision attacks, and Section 5 their quantum coun-
terpart. In Section 6, we use similar methods to perform state-recovery attacks
on reduced-round versions of the AE scheme Gimli-Cipher. Section 7 presents
our new results regarding statistical distinguishers, with new linear trails and
differential-linear attacks. We conclude the paper in Section 8 with a summary,




In this section we describe the Gimli permutation and we provide an overview of
previous cryptanalysis results. The Gimli-Hash function is described directly in
Section 4.
We adopt the following notations in this paper: ≪,≫,≪,≫ represent re-
spectively shift left, shift right, rotate left and rotate right operations. 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧 will
denote elements of F322 . SP is the 96-bit SP-Box. We denote 𝑥𝑖 the (𝑖 mod 32)𝑡ℎ
bit of 𝑥 (𝑥33 = 𝑥1) with 𝑥0 least significant (right-most). We denote the output
of the SP box as SP(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧) = (𝑥′, 𝑦′, 𝑧′) and SP2(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧) = (𝑥′′, 𝑦′′, 𝑧′′).
2.1 The Gimli Permutation
State Structure. We denote by 𝑆 the 384-bit Gimli state, which is the concatena-
tion of 4 columns of 96-bit, that we denote 𝐴,𝐵,𝐶,𝐷, where 𝐴 is column number
0, and 𝐷 is column number 3. Each column is cut into three 32-bit words 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧
which are denoted e.g. 𝐴𝑥, 𝐴𝑦, 𝐴𝑧. Thus, the state is a 4× 3× 32 parallelepiped.
We will speak of the 𝑥 lane to denote the sequence or concatenation of words
𝐴𝑥, 𝐵𝑥, 𝐶𝑥, 𝐷𝑥.
SP-Box. The only non-linear operation in Gimli is the SP-Box, which is applied
columnwise. On input 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧, it updates the three words as follows:
1. Rotate 𝑥 and 𝑦: 𝑥← 𝑥 ≪ 24, 𝑦 ← 𝑦 ≪ 9.
2. Perform the following non-linear operations in parallel (shifts are used rather
than rotations):
𝑥← 𝑥⊕ (𝑧 ≪ 1)⊕ ((𝑦 ∧ 𝑧)≪ 2),
𝑦 ← 𝑦 ⊕ 𝑥⊕ ((𝑥 ∨ 𝑧)≪ 1),
𝑧 ← 𝑧 ⊕ 𝑦 ⊕ ((𝑥 ∧ 𝑦)≪ 3).
3. Swap 𝑥 and 𝑧: (𝑥, 𝑧)← (𝑧, 𝑥).
Rounds. Gimli applies a sequence of 24 rounds numbered from 24 downto 1
inclusively. Each round applies an SP-Box layer, then performs a swap (every
two rounds, either a “big swap” or a small “small swap” as shown in Algorithm 1)
and a constant addition (every four rounds). The constant at round 𝑖, if there is
one, will be denoted rc𝑖 in what follows. In Gimli we have: rc𝑖 = 0x9e377900⊕ 𝑖.
Note that all the attacks studied in this paper are independent of the choice of
round constants.
An algorithmic depiction of full Gimli is given in Algorithm 1and it is depicted
in Figure 10, where each wire represents a word.
Boolean Description of the SP-Box Now we give a full description of the
SP box using Boolean functions:
– for 𝑥′: ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
𝑥′0 = 𝑦23 + 𝑧0
𝑥′1 = 𝑦24 + 𝑧1
𝑥′2 = 𝑦25 + 𝑧2
𝑥′𝑖 = 𝑦𝑖−9 + 𝑧𝑖 + 𝑥𝑖+5𝑦𝑖−12, 3 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 32 ,
(1)
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Algorithm 1 The full Gimli permutation.
Input: State 𝑆 = 𝐴,𝐵,𝐶,𝐷
Output: Gimli(𝑆)
1: for 𝑟 = 24 downto 1 inclusive do
2: 𝐴,𝐵,𝐶,𝐷 ← 𝑆𝑃 (𝐴), 𝑆𝑃 (𝐵), 𝑆𝑃 (𝐶), 𝑆𝑃 (𝐷) ◁ SP-Box layer
3: if 𝑟 mod 4 = 0 then
4: Swap 𝐴𝑥 and 𝐵𝑥, swap 𝐶𝑥 and 𝐷𝑥 ◁ small swap
5: 𝐴𝑥 ← 𝐴𝑥 ⊕ rc𝑟 ◁ Constant addition
6: else if 𝑟 mod 2 = 0 then




– for 𝑦′: {︃
𝑦′0 = 𝑥8 + 𝑦23
𝑦′𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖+8 + 𝑦𝑖−9 + 𝑥𝑖+7 + 𝑧𝑖−1 + 𝑥𝑖+7𝑧𝑖−1, 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 32 ,
(2)
– and for 𝑧′: ⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
𝑧′0 = 𝑥8
𝑧′1 = 𝑥9 + 𝑧0
𝑧′𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖+8 + 𝑧𝑖−1 + 𝑦𝑖−11𝑧𝑖−2, 2 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 32 .
(3)
Description of the SP2 Box. If 𝑥′0 = 𝑦23 + 𝑧0 as in Equation (1) then it
naturally holds that 𝑥′′0 = 𝑦′23 + 𝑧′0 and thus we can use Equations (2) and (3)
to get the full formula. Here we write some of them:
𝑥′′
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
𝑥′′0 = 𝑥8 + 𝑥30 + 𝑥31 + 𝑦14 + 𝑧22 + 𝑥30𝑧22
𝑥′′1 = 𝑥9 + 𝑥31 + 𝑥0 + 𝑦15 + 𝑧0 + 𝑧23 + 𝑥31𝑧23
𝑥′′2 = 𝑥10 + 𝑥0 + 𝑥1 + 𝑦16 + 𝑧1 + 𝑧24 + 𝑦23𝑧0 + 𝑥0𝑧24
𝑥′′𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖−2 + 𝑥𝑖−1 + 𝑥𝑖+8 + 𝑦𝑖−18 + 𝑧𝑖−10 + 𝑧𝑖−1 + 𝑥𝑖−2𝑧𝑖−10 + 𝑦𝑖−11𝑧𝑖−2
+𝑥𝑖−4𝑦𝑖−4 + 𝑥𝑖−4𝑧𝑖+5 + 𝑦𝑖−4𝑦𝑖+11 + 𝑦𝑖+11𝑧𝑖+5 + 𝑥𝑖−5𝑧𝑖+5 + 𝑥𝑖−5𝑦𝑖−4
+𝑦𝑖−4𝑧𝑖−13 + 𝑧𝑖−13𝑧𝑖+5 + 𝑥𝑖−4𝑥𝑖+10𝑦𝑖−7 + 𝑥𝑖+10𝑦𝑖−7𝑦𝑖+11
+𝑥𝑖−5𝑦𝑖−4𝑧𝑖−13 + 𝑥𝑖−5𝑧𝑖−13𝑧𝑖+5 + 𝑥𝑖−5𝑥𝑖+10𝑦𝑖−7 + 𝑥𝑖+10𝑦𝑖−7𝑧𝑖−13




𝑦′′0 = 𝑥30 + 𝑥31 + 𝑦14 + 𝑦31 + 𝑧8 + 𝑧22 + 𝑥13𝑦28 + 𝑥30𝑧22 (5)
𝑧′′
{︃
𝑧′′0 = 𝑦31 + 𝑧8 + 𝑥13𝑦28
𝑧′′1 = 𝑥8 + 𝑦0 + 𝑧9 + 𝑥14𝑦29
(6)
The 2-round probability 1 linear relation 𝑥′′0 + 𝑦′′0 + 𝑧′′0 = 𝑥8 follows.
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2.2 Previous work
We provide here a brief overview of the main previous third-party results of
cryptanalysis against either the permutation or the NIST candidate Gimli. Notice
that all the cryptanalysis previously considered were classical attacks, while in
this paper, we will also give quantum attacks on reduced-round Gimli-Hash. Let
us point out that no search of linear trails was done prior to our work.
Zero-sum permutation distinguishers on 14 rounds. In [15], Cai, Wei, Zhang,
Sun and Hu present a zero-sum distinguisher on 14 rounds of Gimli. This dis-
tinguisher uses the inside-out technique and improves by one round the integral
distinguishers given by the designers.
Structural permutation distinguisher on 22.5 rounds. In [24], Hamburg proposed
the first third-party cryptanalysis of the Gimli permutation, providing distin-
guishers on reduced-round versions of the permutation. This analysis does not
depend on the details of the SP-Box, and is based only on the slow diffusion of
Gimli. Thus, it follows a similar path as the distinguishers of Section 3. In his
work, Hamburg defines a PRF with 192-bit input 𝑥 and 192-bit key 𝑘 that com-
putes 𝐹 (𝑘, 𝑥) = trunc192(Gimli(𝑘‖𝑥)). He gives a distinguishing attack in time
264 for 15.5 rounds (omitting the final swap), and a key-recovery attack on 𝐹
when using 22.5 rounds of Gimli, precisely rounds 25 to 2.5 (omitting again the
final swap). This attack runs in time 2138.5 with a memory requirement of 2129,
which is faster than the expected 2192, and thus shows that 22.5-round Gimli
behaves differently than what could be expected from a random permutation.
Hamburg’s attacks are based on a meet-in-the-middle approach, exploiting
the slow diffusion by tabulating some of the values that are passed from an SP-
Box to another. The 15.5-round distinguisher relies on a table of size 264, and
the 22.5-round attack on a table of size 2128. None of these attacks are practical.
ZID Permutation Distinguishers. In an independent and simultaneous work
posted on ePrint [34], Liu, Isobe, and Meier present a “hybrid zero-internal dif-
ferential” (ZID) distinguisher on full Gimli, which extends a ZID distinguisher
of previous unpublished work. The basic ZID distinguisher happens to be what
we call an internal symmetry distinguisher, where states with symmetries are
produced in the input and in the output of a reduced-round variant of Gimli.
A “hybrid” one adds a limited birthday-like property (which is absent from our
distinguishers). The steps that they take are however different from ours, as this
distinguisher only spans 14 rounds. Compared with our analysis in Section 3,
they will actually start from a much more constrained middle state, which lim-
its the number of rounds by which one can extend the distinguisher afterwards
(or significantly increases the complexity). In contrast, we complete the middle
state in multiple successive steps, each step ensuring that more rounds will be
later covered. The ZID distinguisher targets 18 rounds of Gimli with a negligible
complexity. After the publication of our results, and personal communications,
the authors updated their ePrint report [34]. They proposed to modify our dis-
tinguisher of Section 3 to reduce the complexity from 264 to 252.
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Collisions and Preimages on Gimli-Hash. In [39], Zong, Dong and Wang study
Gimli among other candidates of the competition. They present a 6-round colli-
sion attack on Gimli-Hash of complexity 2113, using a 6-round differential char-
acteristic where the input and output differences are active only in the rate. This
differential characteristic was invalidated in [33].
In [32], [34] and [33] Liu, Isobe and Meier give collision and preimage attacks
on reduced-round Gimli-Hash. Their attacks rely on divide-and-conquer methods,
exploiting the lack of diffusion between the columns, as did Hamburg, but they
also rely on SP-Box equations in order to attack the hash function itself. These
equations are different from those that we will solve in Section 4, and they mostly
relate the input and outputs of a single SP-Box, whereas we study directly two
SP-Boxes. Their analysis is also much more precise, since they prove running
times of solving these equations.
After giving a meet-in-the-middle generic preimage attack of time and mem-
ory complexity 2128, which sets a bound against the sponge construction used
in Gimli-Hash, they give practical preimage attacks on 2-round Gimli-Hash and
practical collision attacks on 3-round Gimli-Hash. They give a collision attack
on 5-round Gimli-Hash with a time complexity 265 and a second preimage at-
tack with time complexity 296. They give in [34] a preimage attack on 5-round
Gimli-Hash. In [33], they give a semi-free start collision attack on 8 rounds and
a state-recovery attack on the AE scheme for 9 rounds.
2.3 On the Notion of Distinguisher
Some of our results are “distinguishers” targeting the Gimli permutation itself.
However, as there is a unique instance of this permutation, what is the meaning
of “distinguishing” it from a random permutation?
As far as primitives are concerned, distinguishers are normally defined for
keyed algorithms, and work as follows (in the case of a block cipher). First, an
𝑛-bit block cipher 𝐸𝑘 is instantiated with a key 𝑘 picked uniformly at random
from the relevant set, and a permutation 𝑃 of F𝑛2 is picked uniformly at random
from the set of such permutations. Then, the attacker is given black-box access
to both algorithms and their task is to figure out which is which with a success
probability greater than 1/2.
This notion of distinguisher breaks down when we look at cryptographic
permutations. Indeed, since there is no key, the permutation 𝜋 used is picked
from a set of size 1, and thus the attacker could simply query for instance 𝑃 (0)
and, if it is equal to 𝜋(0), win the game with overwhelming probability.
At the same time, it is also obvious that cryptographic permutations must
satisfy specific requirements in order for them to be valid building blocks for
secure hashing or AEAD. To take a trivial example: using the notion of dis-
tinguisher outlined above, it is not much harder to distinguish the Keccak per-
mutations from random than it is to distinguish the identity from random. And
yet, instantiating a sponge with each of these permutations yields hash functions
with vastly different security levels.
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As we can see, the problem of defining a distinguisher for a fixed permutation
is in fact close to that of defining one for an open key cipher, i.e. a block cipher
instantiation for which the key is known. A first notion to capture the meaning
of “distinguisher” in this context was proposed by Gilbert in [19], namely that
of T-intractable relation. Informally, a T-intractable relation ℛ is such that it
is infeasible to find a set 𝑋 = (𝑥0, . . . , 𝑥𝑖) of inputs and a corresponding set
𝑌 = (𝑃 (𝑥0), . . . , 𝑃 (𝑥𝑖)) of outputs such that 𝑋 ℛ 𝑌 in time less than 𝑇 if 𝑃
is a permutation picked uniformly at random. Of course, the definition of ℛ
cannot be chosen arbitrarily—otherwise, we could simply define ℛ to be such
that 𝑥 ℛ 𝐸𝑘(𝑥). For a keyed primitive, the relation should not depend on the
key.
As a consequence, it is natural to rely on linear structures to define a relation-
shipℛ that may be of interest when assessing the security level of a cryptographic
permutation. The limited birthday [20,26], originally intended for hash functions,
is an approach in this direction. The idea is to find pairs of inputs (𝑥, 𝑥′) such
that the pair (𝑥⊕ 𝑥′, 𝐻(𝑥)⊕𝐻(𝑥)) lives in a vector space of a high dimension.
If these pairs can be found faster than with a classical birthday search, then it
is a distinguisher.
In this paper, we propose another type of distinguisher whereby we generate
an input 𝑥 such that (𝑥, 𝑃 (𝑥)) lives in a specific affine space. As with the limited
birthday, if this can be done faster than with a brute-force approach, then it can
be seen as a distinguisher.
More generally, we consider that a distinguisher for a permutation is an
algorithm that can return (tuples of) input/output pairs in a specific affine space
that is more efficient than the generic algorithm. As the aim of a cryptographic
permutation is to yield complex and non-linear relations between its input and
output, we claim that this approach is the correct one to assess the security of
a keyless cryptographic permutation.
3 Internal Symmetry Distinguishers against Gimli
In this section we present new distinguishers on the Gimli permutation. Our
distinguishers improve upon the best previously known ones, reaching the full 24-
round permutation. They are practical on 23 rounds and have been implemented.
The results presented in this section do not exploit the specifics of the SP-Box:
they would work equally well if the SP-Box was replaced with a permutation
picked uniformly at random. Like all the other analyses presented in this paper,
they do not depend on the values of the round constants.
Our distinguishers rely on internal symmetries. The general idea consists
in identifying a specific form of symmetry (formally, a vector space) that is
preserved by the round function under some circumstances, and then trying to
craft an input for the permutation such that this symmetry traverses all the
rounds so that the output has the same type of property.
In our case, we formalize the symmetry using the notion of 2-identical states.
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Definition 1 (2-identical states). A state 𝑆 is 2-identical if 𝐵 = 𝐷, if 𝐴 =
𝐶, or if one of these properties holds up to a swap and a constant addition.
Our internal symmetries distinguisher aims at finding a 2-identical input that is
mapped to a 2-identical output. Since there are 96 bits of constraint, a generic
algorithm returning such an input should run in time 296 by evaluating the
permutation on a set of inputs satisfying the property until the output matches
it by chance. Our aim is to find more efficient algorithms in the case of Gimli.
This definition is similar to the one used in [16]. In fact, an internal symmetry
distinguisher can be seen as a stronger variant of a limited birthday distinguisher
of the type used in [16]. Indeed, we can build a limited birthday pair using our
distinguisher: by producing a pair of inputs 𝑆, 𝑆′ satisfying the internal symmetry
property, we obtain 𝑆 ⊕ 𝑆′ ∈ 𝑉𝑖𝑛 and 𝛱(𝑆) ⊕𝛱(𝑆′) ∈ 𝑉𝑜𝑢𝑡. Further, since the
converse is not true, an internal symmetry distinguisher is strictly stronger.
From now on, 𝑆𝑖 denotes the Gimli state before round 𝑖.
3.1 23-round Practical Distinguisher
We design an internal symmetry distinguisher on 23 rounds of Gimli, that is
represented in Figure 2, running in time equivalent to 232 evaluations of Gimli on
average. Algorithm 2 starts from a symmetric state in the middle and completes
the state 𝑆11 in three steps. Each step assigns a value to more words of the state,
and ensures that the 2-identical symmetry property traverses more rounds.
Each step of Algorithm 2 requires to evaluate a few SP-Boxes 232 times (we do
not even need to evaluate the inverse SP-Box). The total amount of computations
is smaller than 232 evaluations of 23-round Gimli. Notice also that the algorithm
uses only a small amount of memory. Our implementation of Algorithm 2 ran in
less than one hour on a regular laptop.
The time complexity of the algorithm can be computed as follows: 8 × 232
SP-Box evaluations for the first step, 8× 232 for the second and 16× 232 for the
third, meaning a total of 8 × 232 + 8 × 232 + 16 × 232 = 40 × 232 which is less
than 232 evaluations of 23-round Gimli (each of them consisting essentially of 92
SP-Box evaluations). This complexity is to be compared to that of the generic
algorithm for obtaining our internal symmetry property, which costs 296.
Below, we provide an example of input-output pair that we obtained, with a
2-identical input 𝑆 that remains 2-identical after Gimli(23, 1):
7f9fcf70 6aedf7e6 7f9fcf70 cb2f0e6a
Input: 0ba2f1f9 f339b619 0ba2f1f9 f70cf15c
b2ee8259 df0b4801 b2ee8259 3856106d
a8ef848d 8c17b743 9615b3bc 8c17b743
Output: 541122c5 30530879 8d9d5d30 30530879
74b6dbe6 18885a6e 744b55c1 18885a6e
3.2 Distinguisher on full Gimli and Extensions
Here we will describe how to extend the 23-round distinguisher to the full Gimli

































Fig. 2. Distinguisher on 23 rounds. The same color for symmetric branches or columns
at a given round means that they are equal.
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Algorithm 2 23-round internal symmetry distinguisher.
Output: a 2-identical state 𝑆 such that Gimli(23, 1)(𝑆) is 2-identical
We start from the middle. We will be interested in the state 𝑆11.




Notice that due to the small swap operation, the values 𝐵11𝑥 and 𝐷11𝑥 actually come
from 𝐴 and 𝐶 and depend only on 𝐴15 and 𝐶15. At this point, we have ensured
that for any values of 𝐵15 = 𝐷15:
– 𝑆23 is 2-identical: indeed, 𝐴 and 𝐶 will remain identical from rounds 16 to 19
backwards. Then, the small swap backwards injects the same value in 𝐴 and
𝐶 since 𝐵 and 𝐷 are also identical. Thus, 𝐴23 = 𝐶23.
– 𝑆7 is 2-identical: indeed, since 𝐵11𝑥 = 𝐷11𝑥 , 𝐵 and 𝐷 remain equal until the
SP-Box layer of round 8, and the 2-identical property remains after the small
swap of round 8.
Once good values have been found, we can compute part of the state 𝑆11: 𝐴11𝑦,𝑧,
𝐶11𝑦,𝑧, and 𝐵11𝑥 = 𝐷11𝑥 are fixed. The rest remains free.
2. Select 𝐴11𝑥 = 𝐶11𝑥 ⊕ rc12 such that 𝐵7𝑥 = 𝐶7𝑥. At this point, the two-identicality of
the output state is preserved through 4 more rounds (until round 4 included): 𝑆3
is 2-identical.
In the state 𝑆11, 𝐵11𝑦,𝑧 = 𝐷11𝑦,𝑧 remain free.
3. Select 𝐵11𝑦,𝑧 = 𝐷11𝑦,𝑧 such that 𝐵3𝑥 = 𝐶3𝑥. Thus, the output 𝑆0 is 2-identical.
Figure 1 from Section 1. An extension of our distinguisher to the full Gimli is a
trivial matter. Indeed, after running Algorithm 2, we obtain a 2-identical input
state 𝑆23 = 𝐴23, 𝐵23, 𝐶23, 𝐷23 with 𝐴23 = 𝐶23. Then, if 𝐵23𝑥 = 𝐷23𝑥 , which
is a 32-bit condition, the state remains 2-identical after the inverse round 24.
By repeating the previous procedure 232 times, we should find an input value
that verifies the output property. The generic complexity of finding a 2-identical
input that generates a 2-identical output is still 296. Thus, full Gimli can be
distinguished in time less than 232+32 = 264 full Gimli evaluations, and constant
memory.
An interesting question is: how many rounds of a Gimli-like permutation
can we target? The distinguisher works mainly because the diffusion in Gimli is
somewhat slow. Thus, a possible fix would be to increase the number of swaps,
for example by having one in each round instead of every two rounds. An attack
exploiting this behaviour that worked previously for 𝑟 rounds would now a priori
work for 𝑟/2 rounds only. Of course, the details of the SP-box could allow further
improvement of these results given that a single iteration would now separate
the swaps rather than a double.
Extending to 28 Rounds. It is trivial to adapt this distinguisher to an extended
version of Gimli with more rounds. The 2-identicality of 𝑆0 is preserved after one
round since the next round would apply only an SP-Box layer and a small swap.
Similarly, the 2-identicality of 𝑆24 is preserved after 3 more inverse rounds since
the next swap operation is a big swap which exchanges data between 𝐴 and
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Table 2. Collision attacks on round-reduced Gimli
Type Nbr of rounds Time complexity Memory complexity
Standard 8 8× 232 × 𝑡𝑒 (practical) negl.
Standard 12 8× 296 × 𝑡𝑒 negl.
Quantum 14 ≃ 8× 264 × 𝑡𝑒 negl.
Semi-free start 12 10× 232 × 𝑡𝑒 negl.
Semi-free start 16 10× 296 × 𝑡𝑒 negl.
Semi-free start 18 7× 296 × 𝑡𝑒 264
Semi-free start 18 296 296
Semi-free start, quantum 20 ≃ 264 × 10× 𝑡𝑒 264
𝐶 only. Thus, our practical distinguisher works against Gimli(23, 0) (a 24-round
version of Gimli shifted by one round), and our extended distinguisher works
against Gimli(27, 0) (a 28-round version of Gimli).
4 Classical Collisions on Reduced-Round Gimli-Hash
In this section, we describe collision attacks on Gimli-Hash when it is instantiated
with a round-reduced variant of Gimli. Table 2 summarizes our results.
4.1 The Gimli-Hash Function
This function is built using the Gimli permutation in a sponge construction [8],
represented in Figure 3.
Gimli-Hash (Algorithm 5) initializes the Gimli state to the all-zero value. The
message is padded and separated into blocks of size 𝑟 = 128, which corresponds
to the rate 𝑟, introducing message blocks of 128 bits between two permutation
applications by XORing them to the first 128 bits of the state. Once all the
padded message blocks are processed, a 32-byte hash is generated by outputting
16 bytes of the internal state, applying once more the permutation, and out-
putting 16 additional ones. In Gimli-Hash, the rate part is formed of the words
𝐴𝑥, 𝐵𝑥, 𝐶𝑥, 𝐷𝑥 and the capacity part of 𝐴𝑦,𝑧, 𝐵𝑦,𝑧, 𝐶𝑦,𝑧, 𝐷𝑦,𝑧.
We will consider two kinds of collision attacks:
– Full-state collision attacks: we will build pairs of two-block messages 𝑀0,𝑀1
and 𝑀0,𝑀 ′1 such that the state after absorbing these pairs becomes again
equal. Thus, one can append any sequence of message blocks after this and
obtain the same hash.
– Semi-freestart collision attacks: we will build pairs of (384-bit) states 𝑆, 𝑆′
such that 𝑆 differs from 𝑆′ only in a single 𝑥, and after 𝑟 rounds of Gimli,
𝜋(𝑆) and 𝜋(𝑆′) differ only in a single 𝑥 as well. This does not yield a collision
on the hash function as we would need to choose the value of the same initial
state; however, it represents a vulnerability that may be used in the context




















Fig. 3. Gimli-Hash (𝑃 stands for the Gimli permutation). The rate part is formed of
the words 𝐴𝑥, 𝐵𝑥, 𝐶𝑥, 𝐷𝑥 and the capacity part of 𝐴𝑦,𝑧, 𝐵𝑦,𝑧, 𝐶𝑦,𝑧, 𝐷𝑦,𝑧.
contains a key of 256 bits and a nonce of 128 bits which is put in the 𝑥 values.
Then each block of plaintext is handled in the same way as Gimli-hash. Thus,
by XORing the right values before and after 𝜋, one can create a key, a nonce
and a pair of messages which yield the same tags.
4.2 SP-Box Equations and How to Solve Them
All collision attacks in this section exploit the slow diffusion of Gimli and the
simplicity of the SP-Box (contrary to the distinguishers on the permutation,
which worked regardless of the SP-Box used). In this section, we describe a series
of “double SP-Box equations”; solving them will be the main building block of
our attacks. We define the following equations.
Given 𝑦, 𝑧, find 𝑥 ̸= 𝑥′ such that 𝑆𝑃 2(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧)𝑥 = 𝑆𝑃 2(𝑥′, 𝑦, 𝑧)𝑥 . (7)
Given 𝑦, 𝑧, 𝑦′, 𝑧′, find 𝑥 such that 𝑆𝑃 2(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧)𝑥 = 𝑆𝑃 2(𝑥, 𝑦′, 𝑧′)𝑥 . (8)
Given 𝑦, 𝑧, 𝑦′, 𝑧′, find 𝑥 such that 𝑆𝑃 2(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧)𝑧 = 𝑆𝑃 2(𝑥, 𝑦′, 𝑧′)𝑧 . (9)
Given 𝑦, 𝑧, 𝑥′, find 𝑥 such that 𝑆𝑃 2(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧)𝑥 = 𝑥′ . (10)
Number of Solutions. Except Equation (7), all these equations have on average,
when the inputs are drawn uniformly at random, a single solution. However,
the variance on the number of solutions depends on the equation considered.
For example, only approx. 6.2% of inputs to Equation (8) have a solution, and
they have on average 82.4 solutions each. Equation (10) gives a little more than
1.5 solutions. This variance is not a problem for us, as long as we can produce
efficiently all solutions of the equations, which remains the case. In order to
simplify our presentation, we will do as if equations (8), (9) and (10) always
gave exactly a single solution for each input.
Solving the Equations. We use an off-the-shelf SAT solver [38]. In some cases,
more time seems spent building the SAT instance rather than solving it, and we
believe that our current implementation is highly unoptimized.
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The solver allows us to retrieve all solutions of a given equation (we treat
Equation (7) differently because it has on average 232 of them). Let us consider
the average time to produce a solution when random inputs are given. On a stan-
dard laptop, this time varies between approximately 0.1 milliseconds (Equation
(8)) and 1 millisecond (Equation (10)). This difference mainly stems from the
fact that Equation (8) often has no solutions, and that the solver quickly finds a
counterexample, while Equation (10) practically always has solutions that must
be found.
On the same computer, an evaluation of the full Gimli permutation (not
reduced-round) takes about 1 microsecond, so there is approximately a factor
1000 between computing Gimli and solving a double SP-Box equation.
We consider that all equations have approximately the same complexity and
introduce a factor 𝑡𝑒 that expresses the time taken to solve them in number of
evaluations of Gimli or a reduced-round version (depending on the studied case).
4.3 Practical 8-round Collision Attack
We consider 8 rounds of Gimli, e.g. rounds 21 to 14 included, and name Gimli(21,
14) this reduced-round permutation. We omit the last swap, because it has no
incidence (it only swaps 𝑥 values). The situation is represented on Figure 4. As
before, we name 𝑆𝑖 the partial state immediately before round 𝑖.
Algorithm 3 finds on average a single solution, with any input state. There
is some variance on the number of solutions, that is induced by the SP-Box
equations, but it is small in practice. Furthermore, we can eliminate the memory
requirement by solving Equation (7) for many input random states. Starting from
a given state, it suffices to apply one more Gimli permutation with a random
message block, in order to re-randomize the input.
Remark that if we omit the second step then we already have a semi-free-start
collision attack, because we can reconstruct the inputs 𝐶21 and 𝐷21 immediately
from the middle.
Practical Application: first step. In our practical computations, we considered
rounds 21 to 14 included. We solved step 1, starting from 0, 0, 0, 0 and using a
random message 𝑚1, 0, 0, 0 to randomize the first block. We also solved at the
same time the two Equations (10) that enabled us to go back to 𝐴17𝑥 , 𝐵17𝑥 .
We had to produce 15582838652 ≃ 233.86 solutions for Equation (7) until we
found a solution for Step 1 and for both equations. We verified experimentally
that each solution for Equation (7) yielded on average a solution for the final
equation. We obtained in total 5 solutions (Table 3). There are two different
solutions for 𝐴15𝑥 ⊕ rc16, which yield two and three solutions respectively for 𝐵17𝑥 .
The total computation ran in less than 5000 core-hours. It was easy to run on
many concurrent processes as this algorithm is trivial to parallelize.
Practical Application: second step. We solved step 2, that is, looking for 𝐶21𝑥 ,
𝐷21𝑥 that lead to one of the pairs 𝐴17𝑥 , 𝐵17𝑥 . This step was much faster than the
previous one, although it ought to have the same complexity: this is because we


























Fig. 4. Collision attack on 8 rounds of Gimli, extended to 12 rounds. The first step
fixes the branches in red, which have equal values for the two inputs 𝐴21𝑥 , 𝐴′21𝑥 . Then
we find values of 𝐵21𝑥 , 𝐶21𝑥 , 𝐷21𝑥 that will conform to these branches. Then, the whole
states are deduced. The branches 𝐴13𝑥 and 𝐴11𝑥 remain to match.
in step 2 we benefited from having 5 different possible solutions. We found two
solutions: 𝐶21𝑥 , 𝐷21𝑥 = 819b1392, 9f4d3233 and 𝐶21𝑥 , 𝐷21𝑥 = aa9f6f2d, 3a6e613a.
Putting both Steps Together. With these solutions, we built two collisions on 8-
round Gimli(21, 14). We start from 𝑚1, 0, 0, 0, then after one round, we inject the
values 𝐴21𝑥 , 𝐵21𝑥 , 𝐶21𝑥 , 𝐷21𝑥 and 𝐴′21𝑥 , 𝐵21𝑥 , 𝐶21𝑥 , 𝐷21𝑥 respectively in the rate; then
we obtain two states that differ only on the 𝑥-coordinate of the third column
(not the first, due to a big swap), and we inject two different blocks to cancel
out this difference, obtaining the same state. The full state then collides, and
we can append any message block that we want. The two collisions are given in
Table 4.
Extending the Attack. Remark that the first step can be extended to span any
number of 𝑆𝑃 2-boxes. However, each time we add two more rounds, there is one
more branch coming from the 𝐵,𝐶,𝐷 states which has to match an expected
value, so we add a factor 232 in complexity. Since 𝑡𝑒 ≪ 232, we can do that twice
before meeting the bound 2128. Thus, a collision on 12-round Gimli-Hash can be
built in time 296 × 4× 𝑡𝑒.
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Algorithm 3 8-round collision attack.
Input: an input state 𝐴21, 𝐵21, 𝐶21, 𝐷21.







𝑥 respectively in the rate, after Gimli(21, 14) (without the last swap),
the state differs only on 𝐴𝑥.
Complexity: 7×232× 𝑡𝑒 time and 232 memory or 8×232× 𝑡𝑒 and negligible memory.
The attack runs in two main steps, both of which must solve 232 times a sequence of
SP-Box equations.
Step 1: find good 𝐴21𝑥 , 𝐴′21𝑥 .
1. Find all pairs 𝐴21𝑥 , 𝐴′21𝑥 such that the branch 𝐵19𝑥 collides (there are 232 such
pairs, that can be found in time 232).
2. For each pair, compute 𝐴19𝑦 , 𝐴19𝑧 , 𝐴′19𝑦 , 𝐴′19𝑧 and solve the SP-Box equation (8):
find 𝐴19𝑥 such that the branch 𝐶17𝑥 collides (there is on average one solution)
3. Given this value, compute 𝐴17𝑦 , 𝐴17𝑧 , 𝐴′17𝑦 , 𝐴′17𝑧 and solve the SP-Box equation
(8) again: find 𝐴17𝑥 such that the branch 𝐵15𝑥 collides (there is on average one
solution)
4. Given these values, compute 𝐴15𝑦 , 𝐴15𝑧 , 𝐴′15𝑦 , 𝐴′15𝑧 and solve Equation (9): find
𝐴15𝑥 such that 𝐴13𝑧 and 𝐴′13𝑧 collide.
Since we do that 232 times, we expect on average a single solution such that 𝐴13𝑦
and 𝐴′13𝑦 also collide.
Now that we have found 𝐴21𝑥 , 𝐴′21𝑥 , it remains to find 𝐵21𝑥 , 𝐶21𝑥 , 𝐷21𝑥 that give the
wanted 𝐴19𝑥 , 𝐴17𝑥 , 𝐴15𝑥 (in red on Figure 4). We expect on average a single solution,
and little variation on the number of solutions, as only Equation (10) is involved.
Step 2: find 𝐵21𝑥 , 𝐶21𝑥 , 𝐷21𝑥 .
1. Find 𝐵21𝑥 by solving Equation (10), given the input 𝑦 and 𝑧, and the output 𝑥
wanted. Deduce the values of 𝐵17𝑦 , 𝐵17𝑧
2. Given 𝐵17𝑦 , 𝐵17𝑧 , and 𝐴15𝑥 , solve Equation (10) again to get 𝐵17𝑥 .
3. Now find 𝐶21𝑥 , 𝐷21𝑥 that lead to the wanted 𝐴17𝑥 , 𝐵17𝑥 . First guess the value of
𝐶21𝑥 , deduce 𝐶19𝑦 , 𝐶19𝑧 and with 𝐶19𝑦 , 𝐶19𝑧 , 𝐴17𝑥 , solve Equation (10) to obtain
𝐶19𝑥 . Next, given 𝐷21𝑦 , 𝐷21𝑧 and 𝐶19𝑥 , solve Equation (10) to obtain 𝐷21𝑥 . Deduce
a value for 𝐵17𝑥 and check if it matches what we want; we expect to find a match
after trying all 232 guesses for 𝐶21𝑥 .
4.4 Semi-free Start Collisions on Reduced-round Gimli
We will now design semi-free start collision attacks based on the same principle.
This time, our goal is to obtain two input states 𝑆, 𝑆′ that differ only in the rate
(in practice, only in 𝐴𝑥) and such that after applying a reduced-round Gimli,
the output states differ only in the rate (the 𝑥 values). They can also be seen
as finding one state and two pairs of 2-block messages such that after inserting
both messages we obtain a collision. The previous “first step” remains the same,
with an extension to whichever number of rounds we are targeting. The “second
step” is changed, because we can now choose completely the columns 𝐵,𝐶,𝐷,
e.g. by starting from the middle instead of having to choose only the input rate.
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𝑥 ⊕ rc20 𝐴17𝑥 𝐵21𝑥
dc84bf38 bbdb41f3 1b1da6e4 07f25303 f793fb5f aae48b72
𝐴15𝑥 ⊕ rc16 𝐵17𝑥 𝐴15𝑥 ⊕ rc16 𝐵17𝑥
ddfbc88b 92f536b6 ddfbc803 f72044db
ddfbc88b 0d9605fe ddfbc803 b1c91a60
ddfbc803 55d2252a
Table 4. Two 8-round collisions on Gimli-Hash
Starting state (first message block)
dc84bf38 00000000 00000000 00000000 dc84bf38 00000000 00000000 00000000
Second message block
bbdb41f3 4333192c bc17e444 8a9d06c7 1b1da6e4 4333192c bc17e444 8a9d06c7
Third message block
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 afad801e 00000000
Starting state (first message block)
dc84bf38 00000000 00000000 00000000 dc84bf38 00000000 00000000 00000000
Second message block
bbdb41f3 4333192c 971398fb 2fbe55ce 1b1da6e4 4333192c 971398fb 2fbe55ce
Third message block
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 afad801e 00000000
Doing this allows us to reach 4 rounds more for the same cost as before,
as outlined on Figure 5 and Algorithm 4. We can then append new rounds as
before, reaching 16 rounds classically in time 296 × 10× 𝑡𝑒.
Another Improvement using Precomputations. We are going to win a factor 232
using 264 × 𝑡𝑒 precomputations and a table of size 264. This way, we can attack
two more rounds. Indeed, once we have computed the first step, the two branches
𝐶17𝑥 and 𝐴13𝑥 contain arbitrary fixed values. Then, when we try to find the right
𝐶, we could have a table that for all 𝐶15𝑦 , 𝐶15𝑧 , gives all input-output values for
𝐶17 and 𝐶14, and we could directly use this table to match the values 𝐶15𝑥 and
𝐷15𝑥 that come from 𝐷 (instead of having to make a guess of 𝐶15𝑧 .
Let us fix 𝐶17𝑥 = 𝐴13𝑥 = 0. Thus, we repeat step 1 in Algorithm 4 a total of
264 times in order to have 𝐶17𝑥 = 𝐴13𝑥 = 0. Step 1 now costs 296 × 𝑡𝑒.
The table that we precompute shall contain: for each 𝑥′, 𝑥′′, all values (on
average 1) of 𝑦′, 𝑧′ such that 𝑆𝑃 2(0, *, *) = 𝑥′, 𝑦′, 𝑧′ and 𝑆𝑃 2(𝑥′′, 𝑦′, 𝑧′) = 0, *, *.
Now, in Algorithm 4, for each guess of 𝐵19𝑦,𝑧, and for each guess of 𝐷19𝑦,𝑧, we
can find the value of 𝐶 that matches all the fixed branches in time 1, using this
table. Thus, we can repeat this 296 times, extending the attack by 6 rounds.
– Step 1 costs 2× 296 × 𝑡𝑒 (we solve only 2 equations most of the time, before
aborting if the wanted “0” do not appear).
– The table costs 264 × 𝑡𝑒, which is negligible
– Step 2 costs 296 × 5 × 𝑡𝑒, since it is the same as before, and we only need
forwards computation of SP-Boxes to check if the full path is correct.
Note that we can get rid of the term 𝑡𝑒 if we use a memory of size 296 to store




















guess 𝐵19𝑦 , 𝐵19𝑧 ,
find all 𝐵𝑖
Step 2.2:





Fig. 5. Semi-free start collision attack on 12 rounds of Gimli (see Algorithm 4).
is slightly below 296 evaluations of Gimli, since fewer SP-Boxes are evaluated in
each step than in the full primitive.
5 Better Quantum Collision Attacks
In this section, we explain how our attacks can be extended in the quantum
setting, where even more rounds can be broken. We want to emphasize that, as
our goal is simply to determine a security margin, we will not go into the details
of the implementation of these attacks as quantum algorithms. We will only show
how to use well-known building blocks of quantum computing in order to build
these new attacks, and show why they perform better than the corresponding
generic quantum attacks. At this point, we assume that the reader is familiar
with the basics of quantum computing that are covered in textbooks such as [36].
We define quantum algorithms in the quantum circuit model. The circuit starts
with a set of qubits (elementary quantum systems) initialized to a basis state
and applies quantum operations. The state of the system lies in a Hilbert space
of dimension 2𝑛 if there are 𝑛 qubits. Quantum operations are linear operators
of this space, and a quantum circuit is built from such elementary operators
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Algorithm 4 12-round semi-free start collision attack (see Figure 5).
Input: an initial 𝐴 (can be given)
Output 𝐴𝑥, 𝐴′𝑥, 𝐵,𝐶,𝐷 such that after Gimli(21, 10), only the rate differs.
As before, we don’t write the last swapping step.
Step 1: Same step as in Algorithm 3, extended to 12 rounds. It gives a total of 10
32-bit branches (input values) that are required, that are represented in red on
Figure 5.
Step 2: we will start from the middle.
1. We take an arbitrary value for 𝐵19𝑦,𝑧. This guess enables to deduce all values of
the column 𝐵, from 𝐵21 to 𝐵10, either by simply computing the SP-Box, or
by solving Equation (10) (given two input branches 𝑦, 𝑧, given the output 𝑥,
deduce the input 𝑥). From this, we deduce the value in all branches that go
from 𝐵 to 𝐷 on the figure, hence 4 branches. They are represented in orange
on Figure 5.
2. We take an arbitrary value for 𝐷19𝑦,𝑧. Again, this enables to deduce the whole
sequence of states from 𝐷20 to 𝐷10, either by computing the SP-Box when
possible, or by finding the input 𝑥 value corresponding to a given output. We
also obtain the values of branches that are transmitted from 𝐷 to 𝐶.
3. We now guess 𝐶15𝑧 . Given this, and 𝐶15𝑥 , and the output 𝐴13𝑥 that must be met,
we obtain the whole state by solving another simple SP-Box equation (which
is not Equation (10), but has a similar form).
4. Having deduced 𝐶15, we have only 2−32 chances of obtaining the right 𝐶17𝑥 , so
we have to repeat all of this 232 times.
In total, we have to solve 5 SP-Box equations, 232 times, in both steps, so the time
complexity is 232 × 10× 𝑡𝑒.
coined quantum gates. The result of a quantum computation is accessed through
measurement of the qubits, which destroys their state.
The cryptanalytic algorithms that we consider in this section do not require
any form of query to a black-box, since we want only to build a collision on the
hash function. Thus, they do not require any more specific model (e.g. the Q2
model used in some works in quantum cryptanalysis).
5.1 Tools, Model and Complexity Estimates
Most of the collision attacks presented in this section rely on an exhaustive
search. For example, consider the 8-round attack of Algorithm 3. Both steps are
exhaustive searches in spaces of size 232 that contain on average a single solution:
– In the first step, we find 𝐴21𝑥 such that, after solving a sequence of SP-Box
equations, a 32-bit condition is met: the first equation finds 𝐴′21𝑥 such that
there is a collision in 𝑥 after two SP-Boxes, the second equation finds 𝐴19𝑥
such that there is a collision in 𝑥 after two SP-Boxes, etc., and the final
32-bit condition is that 𝐴′13𝑧 and 𝐴13𝑧 must collide.
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– In the second step, we find the good 𝐶21𝑥 by guessing it and trying to match
with a 32-bit condition.
Quantumly, Grover’s algorithm [23] speeds up exhaustive search quadrati-
cally. Amplitude Amplification [13] is a powerful generalization which applies to
any pair 𝒜, 𝜒 such that:
– 𝒜 is a quantum algorithm without measurements (a unitary and reversible
operation), that takes no input and produces an output 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋.
– 𝜒 : 𝑋 → {0, 1} is a function that decides whether 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 is a “good” output
of 𝒜 (𝜒(𝑥) = 1) or a “failure” of 𝒜, such that 𝜒 can also be implemented as
a quantum algorithm.
Theorem 1 (Amplitude Amplification [13], informal). Let 𝒜 be a quan-
tum algorithm without measurements that succeeds with probability 𝑝 and 𝑂𝜒 be
a quantum algorithm that tests whether an output of 𝒜 is a failure or not. Then
there exists a quantum algorithm that finds a good output of 𝒜 using 𝑂(
√︀
1/𝑝)
calls to 𝒜 and 𝑂𝜒.
Quantum Embeddings. Any classical algorithm admits a quantum embedding,
that is, a quantum algorithm that returns the same results. Note that this is not
a trivial fact, because a quantum algorithm without measurement is reversible.
Definition 2. Let 𝒜 be a randomized algorithm with no input. A quantum em-
bedding for 𝒜 is a quantum algorithm 𝒜′ that has no input, and the distribution
over the possible outcomes of 𝒜′ (after measurement) is the same as the distri-
bution over possible outcomes of 𝒜.
This quantum embedding admits similar time and space complexities, where
classical elementary operations (logic gates) are replaced by quantum gates
and classical bits by qubits. Generic time-space trade-offs have been studied
in [3,31,28], but precise optimizations are required in practice, where the bulk
of the work comes from making the computation reversible. As we just want to
compare costs with quantum generic attacks, the following fact will be useful.
Remark 1. The ratio in time complexities is approximately preserved when em-
bedding classical algorithms into quantum algorithms.
For example, if a classical algorithm has a time complexity equivalent to 1000
evaluations of Gimli, we can consider that the corresponding quantum embed-
ding has a time complexity equivalent to 1000 quantum evaluations of Gimli. In
all quantum attacks, we will give quantum time complexities relatively to quan-
tumly evaluating Gimli. In order to use Amplitude Amplification (Theorem 1
above), we simply need to define classical randomized algorithms for 𝒜 and 𝑂𝜒.
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5.2 Example
We take the example of the classical 8-round collision attack. Both steps run in
classical time 232×4×𝑡𝑒 by running 232 iterates of a randomized algorithm of time
complexity 4 × 𝑡𝑒. Using Amplitude Amplification, we obtain a corresponding
quantum algorithm with time complexity approximately 216× 4× 𝑡𝑞𝑒, where 𝑡𝑞𝑒
is the time to solve quantumly an SP-Box equation, relative to the cost of a
quantum implementation of Gimli. As we remarked above, we can approximate
𝑡𝑞𝑒 ≃ 𝑡𝑒.
This approximation comes from different factors:
– a small constant factor 𝜋2 which is inherent to quantum search.
– the trade-offs between time and space in the detailed implementations of the
primitive and its components. Let us simply notice that Gimli, compared to
other primitives that have been studied in this setting, e.g. AES [27], seems
fairly easy to implement using basic quantum computing operations. In the
example of AES, the most costly component is the S-Box [27], and Gimli
does not have such.
We are mainly interested in the security margin, and these approximations
will be sufficient for us to determine whether a given algorithm runs faster or
slower than the corresponding quantum generic attack. Thus, we will write that
the quantum 8-round attack on Gimli-Hash runs in time ≃ 216 × 4× 𝑡𝑒.
5.3 Quantum Collision Bounds and Quantum Attacks
The best quantum generic attack for finding collisions depends on the computa-
tional model, more precisely, on the cost assigned to quantum-accessible memory.
Different choices are possible, which are detailed e.g. in [25]. In short, the overall
cost of quantum collision search depends on the cost that is assigned to quantum
hardware.
In this paper, we will simply consider the most conservative setting, where
quantum memory is free. Note that this actually makes our attacks overall less
efficient, since the generic algorithm is the most efficient possible (and they’ll also
work in the other settings). In this situation, the best collision search algorithm
is by Brassard, Høyer and Tapp [14]. It will find a collision on Gimli-Hash in
approximately 2256/3 ≃ 285.3 quantum evaluations of Gimli, using a quantum-
accessible memory of size 285.3.
Quantum collision attacks reaching more rounds than classical ones. In [25],
Hosoyamada and Sasaki initiated the study of dedicated quantum attacks on
hash functions. They remarked that quantum collision search does not benefit
from a square-root speedup (it goes from roughly 2𝑛/2 to 2𝑛/3 with the BHT
algorithm, and the gain is even smaller in more constrained models of quantum
hardware), while some collision-finding procedures may have a better speedup,
say, quadratic. Thus:
– there may exist quantum collision attacks such that the corresponding clas-
sical algorithm is not an attack (it gets worse than the generic bound);
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– the quantum security margin of hash functions for collision attacks is likely
to be smaller than the classical one.
Hosoyamada and Sasaki studied differential trails in the hash functions AES-
MMO and Whirlpool. Although our attacks are based on a different framework,
we show that similar findings apply for Gimli.
5.4 Quantum Collision Attacks on Gimli
We assume that 𝑡𝑒 < 220, hence solving an equation costs less than evaluating
reduced-round Gimli 220 times, which is suggested by our computations, and
should hold in the quantum setting as well.
Full-state collisions. By adding another 32-bit condition in the classical 12-
round collision attack, we obtain a procedure which runs classically in time
4 × 2128 × 𝑡𝑒, which is too high. However, using Amplitude Amplification, we
obtain a procedure that runs in quantum time ≃ 4 × 264 × 𝑡𝑒 and reaches 14
rounds, with less complexity than the quantum collision bound.
Semi-free start collisions. We can extend the 18-round semi-free start collision
attack in the same way. Building the table will still cost a time 264. This table
must be stored in a classical memory with quantum random access. The first
step goes from 2× 296 × 𝑡𝑒 classically to approximately 2× 248 × 𝑡𝑒 quantumly.
The second step does as well. Thus, adding a 32-bit condition enables us to
attack 20 rounds in quantum time 264 × 4× 𝑡𝑒.
6 State-recovery Attacks on Gimli-Cipher
In this section, we study state-recovery attacks on Gimli-Cipher. Gimli-Cipher
uses the Duplex mode, where message blocks are XORed in the same place as
in Gimli-Hash. The goal of a state-recovery attack is to recover the complete
internal state, including the capacity. Once this is done, the Duplex is invertible
and the key can also be recovered.
Since there are 256 bits of key in Gimli-Cipher, a meaningful state-recovery
attack can have a complexity up to 2256, although it will not necessarily contra-
dict the security claims of [5], which go only up to 128 bits of security.
The current best attack is from [33], targeting 9 rounds in time 2192 and
memory 2190.
Generic Principle. We will target reduced-round variants of the permutation,
starting, as before, from an intermediate round in order to leverage the round-
dependent linear layer. Due to the Duplex mode, the value of the rate (the 𝑥
words 𝐴𝑥, 𝐵𝑥, 𝐶𝑥, 𝐷𝑥) is known before and after each call to the permutation.
Starting from any nonce, we inject zero messages and observe the results. Let 𝑆 =
(𝐴,𝐵,𝐶,𝐷) be the current state. Let 𝛱 be the reduced-round permutation. Let
𝑆′ = 𝛱(𝑆) and 𝑆′′ = 𝛱(𝑆′). This means that we know 𝑆𝑥 = (𝐴𝑥, 𝐵𝑥, 𝐶𝑥, 𝐷𝑥),
𝑆′𝑥 and 𝑆′′𝑥 .
23
Given 𝑆𝑥 and 𝑆′𝑥, there are on average 2128 possibilities for 𝑆′. Given 𝑆′𝑥 and
𝑆′′𝑥 , there are also 2128 possibilities for 𝑆′′. Thus our goal is to produce these two
lists of (at least) 2128 values and to find a collision between them. We expect a
single collision to occur.
𝐴 𝐵 𝐶 𝐷
2 2 2 2
3 3 3 3
3 3 3 3
2 2 2 2
Fig. 6. Synthesis of 8 rounds of Gimli, with 4 double SP-Boxes. We write in each double
SP-Box the number of word-degrees of freedom.
Strategy for 8 rounds. As we have seen before, the double SP-Box equations
allow to relate the input and outputs of a double SP-Box. Thus, it makes sense
to consider each double SP-Box individually, and to focus on the number of
values that it can take. Without any constraint, it can take 296 values. If we
constrain a word in input or output, it can take 264 values, and so on.
We write 8 rounds of Gimli as on Figure 6, where single-word constraints
are put on the beginning and the end. Since each double SP-Box takes at most
296 values, we can start by writing down a list of these values for each double
SP-Box. We will then merge these lists together progressively. If we merge two
lists of size 2ℓ and 2ℓ
′
, and if the double SP-Boxes have 2 words in common,
then we obtain a list of size 2ℓ+ℓ
′−2×32.
The goal is to obtain a list of states that will match all the input and output
constraints. This is graphically intuitive: on Figure 6, we will progressively merge
the nodes. When we merge two nodes of labels 𝑖 and 𝑗, we obtain a node of label
max(𝑖 + 𝑗 −𝑚, 0) where 𝑚 is the number of edges between them. All outgoing
edges of 𝑖 and 𝑗 are copied to the new node. We will end with a single node,
that represents a list of possible states. The time and memory complexities of
this procedure are roughly equal to the biggest list size encountered, that is, in
log2, 32 times the biggest label that was put on a node during the process.
Starting from Figure 6, our strategy for 8 rounds is to first merge the nodes
pairwise, obtaining Figure 7.
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𝐴 𝐵 𝐶 𝐷
3 3 3 3
3 3 3 3
Fig. 7. 8-round merging process, step 2.
Next, we merge 𝐴,𝐵,𝐶,𝐷 into single nodes, and obtain a label 4. That is,
thanks to the input and output constraints, we have only 2128 choices for each
column separately. Next, there are 4 edges between 𝐴 abd 𝐵, 4 edges between 𝐶
and 𝐷, so we merge into 2128 choices for 𝐴,𝐵 and 𝐶,𝐷 separately. There are 4
edges between the remaining two nodes, so we merge into a list of 2128 possible
states.
This gives a state-recovery attack of time and memory complexity 2128 (up to
a small constant factor). Note that at this point, we can assume that the double
SP-Box has been tabulated, and so, we don’t need to solve equations anymore.
More Rounds. The complexity rapidly increases with the number of rounds.
Once we represent them as on Figure 6 and Figure 7, we find that our merging
strategies are rather limited.
As soon as we move to 10 rounds, the merging process produces nodes of
label 6, that is, lists of size 2192 (see Figure 8). This seems to correspond to the
9-round attack of [33], written differently (note that [33] starts from the first
round of Gimli, and thus, there is a swap immediately after the first SP-box).
With a minor modification in the merging process, we obtain the same com-
plexity for 12 rounds, where the final step gives Figure 9.
With more rounds, that is, adding another layer of double SP-Boxes, all the
merging strategies that we tried produced nodes of label at least 8 (that is, a
complexity 2256). We conjecture that this method cannot perform better.
7 Statistical Analyses of Gimli
7.1 Linear cryptanalysis
This section aims to provide the first analysis of the linear properties of the Gimli
permutation and its components. For this purpose, we used a bit-oriented Mixed
Integer Linear Programming (MILP) modelization of the state transformations
of Gimli constructed according to [1]. The resulting optimization problems were
then solved with the SCIP solver [21,22] to search for linear trails with optimal
correlation.
Using this tool, we provide a rudimentary analysis of the linear approxima-
tion table of the double Gimli SP-box, as well as constructing effective linear
distinguishers for up to the full 24 rounds of the Gimli permutation.
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𝐴 𝐵 𝐶 𝐷
2 2 2 2
3 3 3 3
3 3 3 3
3 3 3 3
2 2 2 2
𝐴 𝐵 𝐶 𝐷
3 3 3 3
3 3 3 3
3 3 3 3
𝐴 𝐵 𝐶 𝐷
4 4 4 4
3 3 3 3
𝐴 𝐵 𝐶 𝐷
5 5 5 5
4 4 4
4
Fig. 8. 10-round merging process. Nodes merged at the next step are displayed with
the same colors.
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𝐴 𝐵 𝐶 𝐷
6 6 6 6
6 4 6
4
Fig. 9. Merging with 12 rounds, final step.
Linear trails of the (double) SP-box We begin by studying the linear trails
of the SP-Box. Since the Gimli permutation mainly uses the composition of the
SP-Box with itself, we focus on the “double" SP-Box SP2.
Let us consider that we apply the double SP-box to 𝐴 = (𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧) to obtain
𝐴′′ = (𝑥′′, 𝑦′′, 𝑧′′) = 𝑆𝑃 2(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧). We are interested in correlated linear approxi-
mations, that is, masks 𝛼 = (𝛼𝑥, 𝛼𝑦, 𝛼𝑧) and 𝛽 = (𝛽𝑥, 𝛽𝑦, 𝛽𝑧) for which
𝑐(𝑆𝑃 2, 𝛼, 𝛽) = 2−96
(︁⃒⃒




{𝐴 : 𝛼 ·𝐴⊕ 𝛽 ·𝐴′′ = 1}
⃒⃒)︁
is as large (in absolute value) as possible. From Section 2.1 we already know that
the relationship 𝑥8 + 𝑥′′0 + 𝑦′′0 + 𝑧′′0 = 0 always holds. This is a linear trail of the
double SP-box with correlation 1, and it is the only one.
An automated MILP-based search for linear trails of correlation 2−1 and 2−2
shows that there exist at least 41 trails of the former kind and 572 of the latter,
but this is not an exhaustive count. Although these approximations probably
only account for a very small fraction of the possible ones, a more thorough
study of the distribution of the different correlation values among all the trails
would be of interest.
We have found no signs of significant linear-hull effects (that is, of different
highly-biased linear trails with the same input and output masks, as shown in
[37]) within these linear approximations of the double SP-box, although since
we have not considered every interesting linear trail, they might still exist for
trails of lower correlation.
Some linear trails of round-reduced Gimli. In order to provide some linear
trails for reduced-round Gimli, we first focus on trails with only one active SP-
Box in each round, or more specifically, with masks which only cover one column
in each round. They do not provide an upper bound on the correlation of more
general trails, but we still think they could be of interest, and this restriction
greatly limits the search space.
More specifically, we consider linear trails on powers of the SP-box such that
the mask for the 𝑥 word is zero every two rounds. This means that the mask
is unaffected by the big and small swaps, and these trails easily translate into
trails for the reduced-round Gimli construction with the same correlation.
We first look at iterative linear trails for the double SP-box so that both the
input and output masks have the 𝑥 word set to zero, which means they can be
easily extended and the correlation is computed using the piling-up lemma from
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As this trail is iterative, we can construct 2𝑙-round trails with correlation 2−26𝑙.
Next, we provide a similar iterative trail for four rounds with correlation
2−47, though we were unable to check optimality and other trails with larger






























With this, we can construct trails of 4𝑙 rounds with correlation 2−47𝑙.
We have also been able to construct an eight-round iterative trail with corre-






















































We also performed some additional experiments to see whether there linear hull
of the linear approximation based on these input and output masks has a larger
linear potential than the one suggested by this single linear trail. We found that,
in fact, there are 8 trails with correlation 2−67, 32 trails with correlation 2−68,
128 trails with correlation 2−69, 466 trails with correlation 2−70, and 1527 trails
with correlation 2−71. This gives the linear approximation an Estimated Linear
Potential (ELP, see [37]) of at least
8 · 2−67·2 + 32 · 2−68·2 + 128 · 2−69·2 + 466 · 2−70·2 + 1527 · 2−71·2 ≃ 2−128.8 .
For comparison, the ELP if we consider a single trail would be 2−67·2 = 2−134.
Additionally, when we consider iterations of this approximation, it is possible
that even more trails appear.
For a small number of rounds, iterative trails are far from optimal. We now
construct some nice trails for up to six rounds. We start with an optimal four-






























We attempt to extend this trail at the top. There are no approximations for
the double SP-box for which the output mask is the input mask of 𝛤4 and so
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Table 5. Linear trails for Gimli. Some of them apply to shifted versions of the algorithm
starting with two consective SP-box substitutions instead of one.
# Rounds Correlation Construction Shift
2 1 Probability 1 trail from 2.1 Yes
6 2−32 𝛤5, 𝛤4 Yes
8 2−55 Rounds 24 to 17 of 𝛤6 No
16 2−122 Rounds 24 to 9 of 𝛤6 No
24 2−189 𝛤6 (ELP ≥ 2−367.6) No
that the input mask has the 𝑥 word set to zero. However, by removing the last


















This gives us a six round linear trail with correlation 2−32.
We now aim to construct an effective 24-round distinguisher for the full
permutation based on the 8-round iterative linear trail. To this end, we find a
prolongation of this linear trail by seven rounds at the top, which includes a
swap. We obtain a 24-round linear trail with correlation 2−189. Furthermore,
because of the linear hull properties of the iterative linear trail, we know that
the ELP of the linear approximation using the same input and output linear

















































































In general, we provide the linear trails for up to 24 rounds of Gimli shown in
Table 5. We should note that we have not proven the optimality of these trails
(in fact we consider it quite likely that they are not), as we have focused on a
very specific subfamily of trails and we haven’t even shown optimality within
that family for more than four rounds.
Our 24-round linear approximation can be used to mount a distinguishing
attack on the Gimli permutation, which also works for the block cipher built
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with the Even-Mansour construction. It is possible to reduce the complexity
slightly by using multiple linear cryptanalysis, as in [12]. The time complexity is
equal to the data complexity, which is a number of known plaintext-ciphertext
pairs inversely proportional to the ELP of 2−367.6. By considering the same
approximation but in the four columns we can mount a multiple attack with an
increase in the capacity by a factor of four.
The problem of finding a linear approximation whose input and output masks
lie on the 𝑥 lane (that is, on the rate of the Gimli-Hash and Gimli-Cipher con-
structions) remains open.
7.2 Differential-Linear Cryptanalysis
We now consider differential-linear cryptanalysis, a technique that combines a
differential trail and a linear trail built independently. The differential-linear
distinguishers of this section have the advantage of smaller complexities than
the linear distinguishers presented above.
We use the approach of Leurent [30] where we actually split the cipher in
three parts 𝐸 = 𝐸⊥∘𝐸⊥⊤∘𝐸⊤, with a differential trail in 𝐸⊤, a linear trail in 𝐸⊥,
and an experimental evaluation of the bias in 𝐸⊥⊤. This gives a more accurate
evaluation of the complexity. More precisely, we consider
– a differential trail 𝛿in → 𝛿out for 𝐸⊤ with probability 𝑝 = Pr𝑋
(︀
𝐸⊤(𝑋) ⊕
𝐸⊤(𝑋 ⊕ 𝛿in) = 𝛿out
)︀
.
– an experimental bias 𝑏 from 𝛿out to 𝛽 for 𝐸⊥⊤:
𝑏 = 𝑐(𝛼 · 𝐸⊥⊤(𝑊 ), 𝛼 · 𝐸⊥⊤(𝑊 ⊕ 𝛿out))
= 2Pr
𝑊
(𝛼 · 𝐸⊥⊤(𝑊 ) = 𝛼 · 𝐸⊥⊤(𝑊 ⊕ 𝛿out))− 1
– a linear trail 𝛼→ 𝛽 for 𝐸⊥ with correlation 𝑐 = 2Pr𝑌 (𝛼 ·𝑌 = 𝛽 ·𝐸⊥(𝑌 ))−1.
If the three parts are independent then we can estimate the bias of the differential-
linear distinguisher as:
𝑐(𝛽 · 𝐸(𝑋), 𝛽 · 𝐸(𝑋 ⊕ 𝛿in)) = 2Pr
𝑋
(𝛽 · 𝐸(𝑋) = 𝛽 · 𝐸(𝑋 ⊕ 𝛿in))− 1 ≈ 𝑝𝑏𝑐2
Therefore, the complexity of the distinguisher is about 2/𝑝2𝑏2𝑐4.
In Gimli, there are no keys, so the assumption of independence does not hold,
but experiments show that the computed bias is close to the reality. In practice,
the best results are obtained when 𝛿out and 𝛼 have a low hamming weight [30].
Differential Trail. We start by picking a trail that mainly follows the one
given by the designers [4] with slight changes to optimize it for for our number
of rounds. We chose a trail with a difference pattern 𝛿out with two active bits.
A differential trail over 5 rounds with probability 𝑝 = 2−28 is given in Table 6.
We considered trade-offs between the different phases, and it never seems to be
worth it to propagate the trail any further.
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Table 6. A 5-round differential trail.
40418080 02010000 00000000 00000000
𝛿in 40400010 00000000 00000000 00000000
80002080 80010080 00000000 00000000
80010080 00000000 00000000 00000000
Round 24 00402000 00000000 00000000 00000000
𝑝 = 2−18 80400080 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000080 00000000 00000000 00000000
Round 23 00400000 00000000 00000000 00000000
𝑝 = 2−8 80000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
Round 22 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
𝑝 = 1 80000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
80000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
Round 21 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
𝑝 = 1 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
𝛿out 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
Round 20 00800000 00000000 00000000 00000000
𝑝 = 2−2 00800000 00000000 00000000 00000000
Experimental Bias. Starting from the target difference pattern 𝛿out at round
19, we experimentally evaluate the bias after a few rounds with all possible masks
𝛼 with a single active bit. Concretely, we choose the state at random, build the
second state by adding 𝛿out and observe the bias a few rounds later.
The most useful results are on the least significant bit 𝑧0 of the last word,
where the probability of having a difference is smaller than 1/2. After computing
8 round, the probability of having an active difference on this bit in round 12 is
1
2 − 2
−6.2, a correlation of 𝑏 = −2−5.2. After 9 rounds, at the end of round 11,
there is a correlation of 𝑏 = −2−16.9. These probabilities are large enough to be
experimentally significant after the 240 trials we have made.
Linear Trail. We use assisted tools to find good linear trails, starting from the
mask corresponding to 𝑧0. The diffusion is not the same depending whether we
start after round 12 or 11 so we show the best 3 rounds linear approximation for
both case. We find a correlation 𝑐 of 2−17 and 2−16 respectively, see Table 7.
Complexity of the distinguishers. We can combine the trails in different
way to obtain distinguishers on 15, 16 or 17 rounds (starting from round 24).
15 rounds We use 5 rounds for 𝐸⊤, 8 rounds for 𝐸⊥⊤, 2 rounds for 𝐸⊥. The
corresponding complexity is 2/𝑝𝑏𝑐2 = 2× 22×28 × 22×5.2 × 24×5 = 287.4.
16 rounds We use 5 rounds for 𝐸⊤, 9 rounds for 𝐸⊥⊤, 2 rounds for 𝐸⊥. The
corresponding complexity is 2/𝑝𝑏𝑐2 = 2× 22×28 × 22×16.9 × 24×5 = 2110.8.
17 rounds We use 5 rounds for 𝐸⊤, 9 rounds for 𝐸⊥⊤, 3 rounds for 𝐸⊥. The
corresponding complexity is 2/𝑝𝑏𝑐2 = 2× 22×28 × 22×16.9 × 24×16 = 2154.8.
Those distinguishers can be used when the Gimli permutation is used to build
a block cipher with the Even-Mansour construction. Such a cipher should ensure
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Table 7. Diffusion of 𝑧0 starting at the end of round 12.
Round 12 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000001
Round 11 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000001
corr = 2−0 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000001
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000001
Round 10 00000000 00800001 00000000 00000000
corr = 2−5 00000000 00000000 00000000 00800201
00000000 00000000 00000000 01c00201
Round 9 00000000 00880000 00000000 01000201
corr = 2−12 00000000 00f10000 00000000 01040000
00000000 01e00000 00000000 01840000
Table 8. Diffusion of 𝑧0 starting at the end of round 11.
Round 11 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000001 00000000 00000000 00000000
Round 10 00000000 00000000 00000001 00000000
corr = 2−0 00000001 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000001 00000000 00000000 00000000
Round 9 00000001 00000000 00800000 00000000
corr = 2−5 00000201 00000000 00800000 00000000
00000201 00000000 01c00000 00000000
Round 8 00000000 00200201 00000000 01004000
corr = 2−11 00000001 00000000 01004001 00000000
01000001 00000000 0180e001 00000000
a birthday bound security of up to 2192 query, which is less efficient than our
differential-linear distinguisher if the number of rounds Gimli is reduced to 17 (or
fewer). Further improvement should be possible with the partitioning technique
of [30], but we leave this to future work.
8 Conclusion
A common point of the results presented in this paper is that they exploit the
relatively slow diffusion between the columns of the Gimli state. This issue has
trivial causes: swaps are effectively the identity for 256 out of the 384 bits of
the internal state, and occur only every second round. Thus, the Gimli SP-Box
is always applied twice, except at the first and last rounds. This means that
the permutation can be viewed as an SPN with only 12 rounds, and with very
simple linear layers. Meanwhile, the double SP-Box is a rather simple function,
and some of our attacks rely crucially on solving efficiently equations that relate
its inputs and outputs.
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Though our results do not pose a direct threat to the Gimli NIST candidate,
low-complexity full-round distinguishers on the permutation or reduced-round
attacks for a high proportion of the rounds (specially when not predicted by the
designers) have been considered in some cases as an issue worth countering by
proposing a tweak, as can be seen for instance in the modification proposed by
the Spook team [2] to protect against the cryptanalysis results from [16]. In
September 2020, after the results of [18] were made public, the NIST offered the
submitters of second-round algorithms to propose status updates. In their doc-
ument [6], the designers of Gimli acknowledged the collision attacks of Section 4
but dismissed the distinguishers of Section 3, and did not introduce any change
to their specification. Later on, Gimli was not accepted among the finalists of the
competition.
The Gimli designers studied other linear layers instead of the swaps, like using
an MDS or the linear transformation from SPARX [17], and they found some
advantages in proving security against various types of attacks. On the other
hand, they also found it unclear whether these advantages would outweight the
costs. We believe our results show some light in this direction: the other variants
that were considered seem a priori to be stronger regarding our analysis, though
an extensive study should be performed.
We believe the symmetry distinguishers might still be improved by exploiting
the properties of the SP-Box, which we have not done yet.
In order to mitigate the attacks based on internal symmetries and guess-and-
determine methods (including our distinguishers on the permutation) a simple
fix would be to perform a swap at each round instead of every second round.
This would however imply a renewed cryptanalysis effort.
Acknowledgments. The authors would like to thank all the members of the
cryptanalysis party meetings, for many useful comments and discussions, in par-
ticular many thanks to Anne Canteaut, Virginie Lallemand and Thomas Fuhr
for many interesting discussions over previous versions of this work. Thanks to
Donghoon Chang for finding some mistakes and inaccuracies, including an error
in a 32-round version of our distinguisher. This project has received funding
from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Hori-
zon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement no. 714294 -
acronym QUASYModo).
References
1. Abdelkhalek, A., Sasaki, Y., Todo, Y., Tolba, M., Youssef, A.M.: MILP model-
ing for (large) s-boxes to optimize probability of differential characteristics. IACR
Trans. Symm. Cryptol. 2017(4), 99–129 (2017)
2. Bellizia, D., Berti, F., Bronchain, O., Cassiers, G., Duval, S., Guo, C., Leander,
G., Leurent, G., Levi, I., Momin, C., Pereira, O., Peters, T., Standaert, F.X.,
Udvarhelyi, B., Wiemer, F.: Spook: Sponge-based leakage-resistant authenticated
encryption with a masked tweakable block cipher. IACR Trans. Symm. Cryptol.
2020(S1), 295–349 (2020)
33
3. Bennett, C.H.: Time/space trade-offs for reversible computation. SIAM J. Comput.
18(4), 766–776 (1989)
4. Bernstein, D.J., Kölbl, S., Lucks, S., Massolino, P.M.C., Mendel, F., Nawaz, K.,
Schneider, T., Schwabe, P., Standaert, F.X., Todo, Y., Viguier, B.: Gimli : A cross-
platform permutation. In: Fischer, W., Homma, N. (eds.) CHES 2017. LNCS, vol.
10529, pp. 299–320. Springer, Heidelberg (Sep 2017)
5. Bernstein, D.J., Kölbl, S., Lucks, S., Massolino, P.M.C., Mendel, F., Nawaz, K.,
Schneider, T., Schwabe, P., Standaert, F.X., Todo, Y., Viguier, B.: Gimli. Sub-
mission to the NIST Lightweight Cryptography project. Available online https:
//csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/Lightweight-Cryptography/
documents/round-1/spec-doc/gimli-spec.pdf. (2019)
6. Bernstein, D.J., Kölbl, S., Lucks, S., Massolino, P.M.C., Mendel, F., Nawaz,
K., Schneider, T., Schwabe, P., Standaert, F.X., Todo, Y., Viguier, B.: Gimli:




7. Bertoni, G., Daemen, J., Peeters, M., Van Assche, G.: Sponge functions. In:
ECRYPT hash workshop (2007)
8. Bertoni, G., Daemen, J., Peeters, M., Van Assche, G.: On the indifferentiability
of the sponge construction. In: Smart, N.P. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2008. LNCS, vol.
4965, pp. 181–197. Springer, Heidelberg (Apr 2008)
9. Bertoni, G., Daemen, J., Peeters, M., Van Assche, G.: Sponge-based pseudo-
random number generators. In: Mangard, S., Standaert, F.X. (eds.) CHES 2010.
LNCS, vol. 6225, pp. 33–47. Springer, Heidelberg (Aug 2010)
10. Bertoni, G., Daemen, J., Peeters, M., Van Assche, G.: Duplexing the sponge: Single-
pass authenticated encryption and other applications. In: Miri, A., Vaudenay, S.
(eds.) SAC 2011. LNCS, vol. 7118, pp. 320–337. Springer, Heidelberg (Aug 2012)
11. Biham, E., Shamir, A.: Differential cryptanalysis of DES-like cryptosystems. Jour-
nal of Cryptology 4(1), 3–72 (Jan 1991)
12. Biryukov, A., De Cannière, C., Quisquater, M.: On multiple linear approxima-
tions. In: Franklin, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 2004. LNCS, vol. 3152, pp. 1–22. Springer,
Heidelberg (Aug 2004)
13. Brassard, G., Hoyer, P., Mosca, M., Tapp, A.: Quantum amplitude amplification
and estimation. Contemporary Mathematics 305, 53–74 (2002)
14. Brassard, G., Høyer, P., Tapp, A.: Quantum cryptanalysis of hash and claw-free
functions. In: Lucchesi, C.L., Moura, A.V. (eds.) LATIN 1998. LNCS, vol. 1380,
pp. 163–169. Springer, Heidelberg (Apr 1998)
15. Cai, J., Wei, Z., Zhang, Y., Sun, S., Hu, L.: Zero-sum distinguishers for round-
reduced Gimli permutation. In: Mori, P., Furnell, S., Camp, O. (eds.) Proceedings
of the 5th International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy,
ICISSP 2019, Prague, Czech Republic, February 23-25, 2019. pp. 38–43. SciTePress
(2019)
16. Derbez, P., Huynh, P., Lallemand, V., Naya-Plasencia, M., Perrin, L., Schrotten-
loher, A.: Cryptanalysis results on Spook - bringing full-round Shadow-512 to the
light. In: Micciancio, D., Ristenpart, T. (eds.) CRYPTO 2020, Part III. LNCS, vol.
12172, pp. 359–388. Springer, Heidelberg (Aug 2020)
17. Dinu, D., Perrin, L., Udovenko, A., Velichkov, V., Großschädl, J., Biryukov, A.:
Design strategies for ARX with provable bounds: Sparx and LAX. In: Cheon,
J.H., Takagi, T. (eds.) ASIACRYPT 2016, Part I. LNCS, vol. 10031, pp. 484–513.
Springer, Heidelberg (Dec 2016)
34
18. Flórez-Gutiérrez, A., Leurent, G., Naya-Plasencia, M., Perrin, L., Schrottenloher,
A., Sibleyras, F.: New results on Gimli: full-permutation distinguishers and im-
proved collisions. In: Moriai, S., Wang, H. (eds.) ASIACRYPT 2020, Part I. LNCS,
vol. 12491, pp. 33–63. Springer, Heidelberg (Dec 2020)
19. Gilbert, H.: A simplified representation of AES. In: Sarkar, P., Iwata, T. (eds.)
ASIACRYPT 2014, Part I. LNCS, vol. 8873, pp. 200–222. Springer, Heidelberg
(Dec 2014)
20. Gilbert, H., Peyrin, T.: Super-sbox cryptanalysis: Improved attacks for AES-like
permutations. In: Hong, S., Iwata, T. (eds.) FSE 2010. LNCS, vol. 6147, pp. 365–
383. Springer, Heidelberg (Feb 2010)
21. Gleixner, A., Bastubbe, M., Eifler, L., Gally, T., Gamrath, G., Gottwald, R.L.,
Hendel, G., Hojny, C., Koch, T., Lübbecke, M.E., Maher, S.J., Miltenberger, M.,
Müller, B., Pfetsch, M.E., Puchert, C., Rehfeldt, D., Schlösser, F., Schubert, C.,
Serrano, F., Shinano, Y., Viernickel, J.M., Walter, M., Wegscheider, F., Witt, J.T.,
Witzig, J.: The SCIP Optimization Suite 6.0. Technical report, Optimization On-
line (July 2018), http://www.optimization-online.org/DB_HTML/2018/
07/6692.html
22. Gleixner, A., Bastubbe, M., Eifler, L., Gally, T., Gamrath, G., Gottwald, R.L.,
Hendel, G., Hojny, C., Koch, T., Lübbecke, M.E., Maher, S.J., Miltenberger,
M., Müller, B., Pfetsch, M.E., Puchert, C., Rehfeldt, D., Schlösser, F., Schu-
bert, C., Serrano, F., Shinano, Y., Viernickel, J.M., Walter, M., Wegscheider,
F., Witt, J.T., Witzig, J.: The SCIP Optimization Suite 6.0. ZIB-Report 18-26,
Zuse Institute Berlin (July 2018), http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:
0297-zib-69361
23. Grover, L.K.: A fast quantum mechanical algorithm for database search. In: 28th
ACM STOC. pp. 212–219. ACM Press (May 1996)
24. Hamburg, M.: Cryptanalysis of 22 1/2 rounds of Gimli. Cryptology ePrint Archive,
Report 2017/743 (2017), https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/743
25. Hosoyamada, A., Sasaki, Y.: Finding hash collisions with quantum computers by
using differential trails with smaller probability than birthday bound. In: Canteaut,
A., Ishai, Y. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 2020, Part II. LNCS, vol. 12106, pp. 249–279.
Springer, Heidelberg (May 2020)
26. Iwamoto, M., Peyrin, T., Sasaki, Y.: Limited-birthday distinguishers for hash
functions - collisions beyond the birthday bound can be meaningful. In: Sako,
K., Sarkar, P. (eds.) ASIACRYPT 2013, Part II. LNCS, vol. 8270, pp. 504–523.
Springer, Heidelberg (Dec 2013)
27. Jaques, S., Naehrig, M., Roetteler, M., Virdia, F.: Implementing grover oracles
for quantum key search on AES and LowMC. In: Canteaut, A., Ishai, Y. (eds.)
EUROCRYPT 2020, Part II. LNCS, vol. 12106, pp. 280–310. Springer, Heidelberg
(May 2020)
28. Knill, E.: An analysis of Bennett’s pebble game. CoRR abs/math/9508218 (1995)
29. Lamberger, M., Mendel, F., Schläffer, M., Rechberger, C., Rijmen, V.: The re-
bound attack and subspace distinguishers: Application to Whirlpool. Journal of
Cryptology 28(2), 257–296 (Apr 2015)
30. Leurent, G.: Improved differential-linear cryptanalysis of 7-round Chaskey with
partitioning. In: Fischlin, M., Coron, J.S. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 2016, Part I. LNCS,
vol. 9665, pp. 344–371. Springer, Heidelberg (May 2016)
31. Levin, R.Y., Sherman, A.T.: A note on Bennett’s time-space tradeoff for reversible
computation. SIAM J. Comput. 19(4), 673–677 (1990)
35
32. Liu, F., Isobe, T., Meier, W.: Preimages and collisions for up to 5-round Gimli-Hash
using divide-and-conquer methods. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2019/1080
(2019), https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1080
33. Liu, F., Isobe, T., Meier, W.: Automatic verification of differential character-
istics: Application to reduced Gimli. In: Micciancio, D., Ristenpart, T. (eds.)
CRYPTO 2020, Part III. LNCS, vol. 12172, pp. 219–248. Springer, Heidelberg
(Aug 2020)
34. Liu, F., Isobe, T., Meier, W.: Exploiting weak diffusion of Gimli: A full-round dis-
tinguisher and reduced-round preimage attacks. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report
2020/561 (2020), https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/561
35. Matsui, M.: Linear cryptanalysis method for DES cipher. In: Helleseth, T. (ed.)
EUROCRYPT’93. LNCS, vol. 765, pp. 386–397. Springer, Heidelberg (May 1994)
36. Nielsen, M.A., Chuang, I.L.: Quantum information and quantum computation.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2(8), 23 (2000)
37. Nyberg, K.: Linear approximation of block ciphers (rump session). In: Santis, A.D.
(ed.) EUROCRYPT’94. LNCS, vol. 950, pp. 439–444. Springer, Heidelberg (May
1995)
38. Soos, M., Nohl, K., Castelluccia, C.: Extending SAT solvers to cryptographic prob-
lems. In: Kullmann, O. (ed.) Theory and Applications of Satisfiability Testing -
SAT 2009, 12th International Conference, SAT 2009, Swansea, UK, June 30 - July
3, 2009. Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 5584, pp. 244–257.
Springer (2009)
39. Zong, R., Dong, X., Wang, X.: Collision attacks on round-reduced Gimli-





The SP-Box is a bijective operation, but its inverse is difficult to write (and it
is never used).
1. Swap 𝑥 and 𝑧
2. Perform:5
𝑥0 ← 𝑥′0
𝑦0 ← 𝑦′0 + 𝑥′0
𝑧0 ← 𝑧′0 + 𝑥′0 + 𝑦′0
𝑥1 ← 𝑥′1 + 𝑧0
𝑦1 ← 𝑦′1 + 𝑥′1 + 𝑧0 + (𝑥0 ∨ 𝑧0)
𝑧1 ← 𝑧′1 + 𝑦′1 + 𝑥′1 + 𝑧0 + (𝑥0 ∨ 𝑧0)
𝑥2 ← 𝑥′2 + 𝑧1 + (𝑦0 ∧ 𝑧0)
𝑦2 ← 𝑦′2 + 𝑥′2 + 𝑧1 + (𝑦0 ∧ 𝑧0) + (𝑥1 ∨ 𝑧1)
𝑧2 ← 𝑧′2 + 𝑦′2 + 𝑥′2 + 𝑧1 + (𝑦0 ∧ 𝑧0) + (𝑥1 ∨ 𝑧1)
∀3 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 32, 𝑥𝑖 ← 𝑥′𝑖 + 𝑧𝑖−1 + (𝑦𝑖−2 ∧ 𝑧𝑖−2)
𝑦𝑖 ← 𝑦′𝑖 + 𝑥𝑖 + (𝑥𝑖−1 ∨ 𝑧𝑖−1)
𝑧𝑖 ← 𝑧′𝑖 + 𝑦𝑖 + (𝑥𝑖−3 ∧ 𝑦𝑖−3)
3. Rotate 𝑥 and 𝑦: 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖+24 mod 32 and 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑦𝑖+9 mod 32
A.2 Gimli-Hash
Algorithm 5 Gimli-Hash (from [5])
Input: 𝑀 ∈ {0, 1}*
Output: ℎ ∈ {0, 1}256
1: 𝑆 ← 0 ◁ Initialize state to 0
2: 𝑚1, . . . ,𝑚𝑡 ← pad(𝑀)
3: for 𝑖 from 1 to 𝑡 do
4: if 𝑖 = 𝑡 then
5: 𝐷𝑧 ← 𝐷𝑧 ⊕ 0x01000000
6: end if
7: 𝑆 ← absorb(𝑆,𝑚𝑖) ◁ XOR 𝑚𝑖 in the rate: 𝐴𝑥, 𝐵𝑥, 𝐶𝑥, 𝐷𝑥, apply Gimli
8: end for
9: ℎ← 𝐴𝑥‖𝐵𝑥‖𝐶𝑥‖𝐷𝑥
10: 𝑆 ← Gimli(𝑆)
11: ℎ← ℎ‖𝐴𝑥‖𝐵𝑥‖𝐶𝑥‖𝐷𝑥
Return ℎ
5 Note that the formulas given page 15 of the specification of Gimli are erroneous. In
the line 𝑧′𝑛 ← 𝑧𝑛 + 𝑦𝑛 + (𝑥𝑛−3 ∧ 𝑧𝑛−3), 𝑧𝑛−3 should be replaced by 𝑦𝑛−3 and 𝑥𝑗 ∧ 𝑧𝑗
must be replaced by 𝑥𝑗 ∧ 𝑦𝑗 in the subsequent formulas.
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A.3 Representation of Full Gimli
SP24 SP SP SP
⊕rc24
SP23 SP SP SP
SP22 SP SP SP
SP21 SP SP SP
SP20 SP SP SP
⊕rc20
SP19 SP SP SP
SP18 SP SP SP
SP17 SP SP SP
SP16 SP SP SP
⊕rc16
SP15 SP SP SP
SP14 SP SP SP
SP13 SP SP SP
SP12 SP SP SP
⊕rc12
SP11 SP SP SP
SP10 SP SP SP
SP9 SP SP SP
SP8 SP SP SP
⊕rc8
SP7 SP SP SP
SP6 SP SP SP
SP5 SP SP SP
SP4 SP SP SP
⊕rc4
SP3 SP SP SP
SP2 SP SP SP
SP1 SP SP SP
Fig. 10. A representation of full Gimli.
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